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The “positivity effect” refers to an age-related trend that favors positive over negative
stimuli in cognitive processing. Relative to their younger counterparts, older people attend
to and remember more positive than negative information. Since the effect was initially
identified and the conceptual basis articulated (Mather and Carstensen, 2005) scores of
independent replications and related findings have appeared in the literature. Over the same
period, a number of investigations have failed to observe age differences in the cognitive
processing of emotional material. When findings are considered in theoretical context, a
reliable pattern of evidence emerges that helps to refine conceptual tenets. In this article
we articulate the operational definition and theoretical foundations of the positivity effect
and review the empirical evidence based on studies of visual attention, memory, decision
making, and neural activation. We conclude with a discussion of future research directions
with emphasis on the conditions where a focus on positive information may benefit and/or
impair cognitive performance in older people.
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THE THEORY BEHIND THE AGE-RELATED POSITIVITY EFFECT
The positivity effect refers to a relative preference in older adults
(compared to younger adults) for positive over negative mater-
ial in cognitive processing. Since the first explicit reference to the
positivity effect in 2004 (Kennedy et al., 2004) more than 100
peer-reviewed articles have addressed the concept1. This flurry
of scholarship has provided overwhelming support for the basic
concept but also has added to our understanding of the subtleties
and limitations of the theory while enriching our understanding
of the role of emotion in cognitive processing in both younger
and older people. Below we articulate the operational definition
of the positivity effect and ground it in the theoretical framework
of socioemotional selectivity theory (SST; Carstensen, 2006). We
then consider the empirical literature, arguing that the pattern of
findings that has emerged in recent years better supports a top-
down, motivational explanation for positivity than accounts that
attribute positivity to cognitive or neurological decline. Finally, we
propose potential future research directions and discuss ways in
which the positivity effect may exert beneficial and detrimental
influences on cognitive processing.
THE OPERATIONAL DEFINITION AND THEORETICAL
FOUNDATION OF THE POSITIVITY EFFECT
Our research group coined the term “positivity effect” to describe
mounting evidence that older adults show a relative preference
for positive over negative information in attention and memory
(Charles et al., 2003; Mather and Carstensen, 2003; Mikels et al.,
2005). “Effect” was chosen over “bias” when the term was coined
because age differences are as frequently driven by a preference for
negative material in the young as they are driven by a preference
1Publication counts based on results of searching “positivity effect” in the PsychInfo
database aging topic area.
for positive material in the old. The positivity effect concerns the
relative difference between older and younger people in attention
to and memory for positive as opposed to negative material2.
The positivity effect was initially identified by investigating pos-
tulates of SST, a life-span theory of motivation (Carstensen, 1993,
2006; Carstensen et al., 1999). According to SST, a core constel-
lation of goals operates throughout adulthood, including basic
goals associated with attachment and control as well as goals asso-
ciated with instrumental needs and emotional gratification. The
key postulate of SST is that the relative importance of goals within
this constellation changes as a function of future time horizons.
Because chronological age is inversely associated with actual and
perceived time left in life, systematic age differences emerge in pre-
ferred goals. Importantly, according to SST, age differences in goal
hierarchies reflect perceived future time more than time since birth
(viz., chronological age). When the future is perceived as long and
nebulous, as it typically is in youth, future-oriented goals related
to gathering information and expanding horizons are prioritized
over emotional gratification. When time horizons are constrained
present-oriented goals related to emotional satisfaction and mean-
ing are prioritized over goals associated with long-term rewards.
In addition to emphasizing changes in goals with age, the theory
predicts that when younger people perceive time constraints or
older people perceive the future as relatively long, age differences
are reduced or eliminated. A number of empirical investigations
2This is not to be confused with preferential memory and attention for emotional
relative to neutral stimuli, which is relatively stable across age groups (see, for exam-
ple,Murphy and Isaacowitz,2008). Unfortunately, readers often mistake the headline
conclusion from Murphy & Isaacowitz to mean that evidence for the positivity effect
is qualified when in fact nearly three-quarters of the studies submitted to their meta-
analysis lacked age comparisons of any kind and about half of the studies failed to
include positive/negative contrasts. Only 15% of the studies Murphy & Isaacowitz
included in their meta-analysis allowed for age and valence comparisons.
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have supported this claim (e.g., Fredrickson and Carstensen, 1990;
Fung et al., 1999; Fung and Carstensen, 2004). When life’s fragility
is made salient by events like September 11th or the SARS epidemic
in Hong Kong, for example, age differences in socioemotional goals
disappear (Fung and Carstensen, 2006). Similarly, under experi-
mental conditions that extend time horizons, older peoples’ goals
closely resemble younger peoples’ goals (Fung et al., 1999). Thus,
the influence of time horizons on goals has been well-established.
The theoretical perspective of SST argues that age-related changes
in goals are adaptive, reflecting the reality that changing time
horizons and ultimately mortality impose. SST incorporates an
evolutionary component that presumes considerable advantages
to life course changes in goals. Focusing on individual strivings
early in life and focusing on emotional goals later in life, which typ-
ically benefit kin, improves reproductive success (see Carstensen
and Löckenhoff, 2003). The presence of grandparents increases the
survival odds of grandchild offspring in humans and some other
mammals, for example (Hawkes, 2003).
Socioemotional selectivity theory maintains that perceived
time horizons play an important role in signaling these shifts
in motivation. When futures are long and nebulous, acquiring
knowledge and exploring help prepare individuals for an array
of uncertain challenges looming ahead. As time horizons grow
shorter, future-oriented goals related to preparation for the long-
term grow less important and present-oriented goals related to
emotional meaning, emotion regulation, and well-being gain in
priority. Accordingly, many observed age-related changes in emo-
tion, cognition, and behavior are presumed to be top-down and
fluid (varying as a function of motivation) rather than bottom-up
and fixed (varying as a function of biological aging or experience).
Early in the last decade, our research team began to test
hypotheses about the ways in which motivational changes pos-
tulated by SST may influence cognitive processing. These efforts
expanded upon a large and rich literature in psychology doc-
umenting the powerful influence that goals exert on cognitive
processing. From classic studies by Neisser and colleagues on inat-
tentional blindness (e.g., Neisser, 1979) to more recent studies on
the subconscious priming of explicit goals (e.g., Chartrand and
Bargh, 1996; Moskowitz, 2002), the literature has revealed pow-
erful top-down effects of goals on information processing. We
reasoned that because chronically activated goals appear to change
systematically with age, such changes may consequently direct
attention and memory toward or away from emotional material
in systematic ways.
When our research team began to examine questions about
potential effects of motivation on cognitive processing, previous
findings suggested that whereas younger people appear to privilege
negative information in cognitive processing (Baumeister et al.,
2001; Rozin and Royzman, 2001), older people commonly priv-
ilege positive information. Indeed, several early studies found a
classic crossover interaction between age and valence (e.g., Mather
et al., 2004; Mikels et al., 2005). Of course, a positive process-
ing preference can result from heightened processing of positive
and/or reduced processing of negative information. Even when
older adults show greater attention to negative than positive but
attend significantly less to negative than younger adults, the pattern
would qualify conceptually as a positivity effect.
Accumulating evidence indicates that the positivity effect
emerges reliably from all combinations of heightened process-
ing of positive and reduced processing of negative information. In
some studies, age differences are driven by younger peoples’greater
attention to and/or memory for negative material (e.g., study 2
in Charles et al., 2003; study 2 in Ready et al., 2007; Shamaskin
et al., 2010). In other studies differences reflect relatively deeper
processing of positive material by older people (e.g., Isaacowitz
et al., 2006b; study 3 in Mather and Knight, 2005). Several inves-
tigations find that while both older people and younger people
attend to negative stimuli more than positive, older people do so
significantly less than younger people (e.g., Comblain et al., 2004;
Kensinger et al., 2007).
The positivity effect has been documented across a variety of
experimental paradigms and a wide range of stimuli, also sup-
porting the robustness of the effect. Studies of visual attention
using dot-probe and eye-tracking paradigms show that, compared
to younger adults, older adults direct their gaze toward happy
and away from angry or sad faces (Mather and Carstensen, 2003;
Isaacowitz et al., 2006a,b). The positivity effect also emerges in
studies of working memory (Mikels et al., 2005), short-term mem-
ory (Charles et al., 2003), autobiographical memory (Kennedy
et al., 2004; Schlagman et al., 2006), and even false memories (Fer-
nandes et al., 2008). Compared to younger adults, older adults
appear to privilege positive over negative stimuli across a wide
range of experimental materials including emotionally valenced
images (Charles et al., 2003; Spaniol et al., 2008), word lists (Piguet
et al., 2008), emotional faces (Mather and Carstensen, 2003; Lei-
gland et al., 2004), and health-related messages (Shamaskin et al.,
2010). Such findings suggest that the effect is not limited narrowly
to a certain type of stimuli. The positivity effect is also evident
in decision making. Compared to younger people, older people
pay greater attention to positive as compared to negative attrib-
utes when choosing among doctors and hospitals (Löckenhoff and
Carstensen, 2007, 2008), cars (Mather et al., 2005), and consumer
products (Kim et al., 2008). Compared to younger adults, older
adults also remember their choices in a manner that is positively
skewed – either via disproportionately recalling positive attrib-
utes and/or via attributing positive attributes to chosen options
and negative attributes to rejected options (Mather and Johnson,
2000; Mather et al., 2005; Löckenhoff and Carstensen, 2007, 2008).
Although the majority of empirical findings have been inter-
preted through the lens of SST, viable alternative explanations
for the empirical phenomenon have been offered. Most notably,
Labouvie-Vief et al. (2010) have argued that positive material
is preferred by older people because negative information, by
comparison, is more cognitively demanding. Along similar lines,
the aging-brain model proposed by Cacioppo et al. (2011) sug-
gests that the positivity effect in memory3 arises from age-related
neural degeneration in the amygdala leading to dampened emo-
tional responses to negative stimuli. In addition to these theoretical
alternatives, several investigators have failed to observe age-related
positivity effects. The literature is now sufficiently large and the
3It should be noted that the aging-brain model (Cacioppo et al., 2011) focuses solely
on the downstream consequences of presumed amygdala dysfunction for memory
and does not address the positivity effect in attention.
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methodologies sufficiently diverse that conceptual alternatives and
empirical findings – especially those that have failed to observe
positivity – can be examined in ways that clarify the nature and
source of these intriguing age differences.
The motivational perspective of SST provides clear and testable
predictions about the conditions under which the positivity effect
should appear and when it should not. As noted above, positivity
theoretically reflects controlled cognition, is driven by chronically
activated goals, and is adaptive for well-being. Thus, the effect
should be most evident when individuals have sufficient cognitive
resources to direct attention, when processing occurs under the
scope of conscious (as opposed to automatic) control, when indi-
viduals are allowed to pursue chronically activated goals without
external interference, and when regulating emotions contributes
to well-being. Conversely, the effect should not appear when cog-
nitive resources are limited, when information processing is auto-
matic, when contexts impose situation-specific goals that conflict
with chronically activated goals, and when prioritizing emotion
regulation has significant risks. To assess the empirical support for
these predictions we review the extensive research literature on the
positivity effect.
In reviewing the empirical literature we focus on three key
conceptual issues: First, we present evidence suggesting that the
positivity effect represents controlled processing not cognitive
decline. Second, we critically examine experimental procedures
and conditions under which the positivity effect is and is not
observed, illustrating that the effect is malleable rather than unreli-
able. Finally, we consider whether effect is adaptive or maladaptive
for older adults’ everyday functioning.
CONTROLLED PROCESSING OR COGNITIVE DECLINE?
According to the motivational perspective offered by SST, the
positivity effect stems from age-related shifts in goal priorities
that increase the salience of emotionally gratifying information in
attention and memory. Because cognitive resources are required
to direct information processing toward goal-relevant stimuli and
away from less relevant stimuli (Mather, 2006), the positivity effect
will be most evident in individuals with relatively good cognitive
control. This postulate clearly distinguishes SST from explanations
rooted in cognitive decline. Reasoning from the latter positions, if
positive material were preferred because negative material is dif-
ficult to process, individuals low in cognitive control would show
the strongest preference for positive material. Mather and Knight
(2005) conducted two studies to examine the role of cognitive con-
trol in positivity. In the first study, older and younger participants
were asked to view a series of emotionally evocative and neu-
tral pictures. After a 20-min delay, participants were administered
an incidental recall test. Compared to younger participants, older
participants recalled a greater proportion of positive images and a
lesser proportion of negative images. In subsequent analyses, the
researchers examined individual differences as a function of cogni-
tive control and found that the positivity effect was most evident
in participants with high levels of cognitive control. In a subse-
quent study, older and younger participants were asked to view
the same images from the first study while they monitored and
detected changes in a sequence of sounds. In this dual-task para-
digm, older adults recalled a greater proportion of negative images
and fewer positive images relative to younger adults. In other
words, when cognitive resources were experimentally diverted, the
preference for positive over negative information was reversed.
Using the same divided-attention task, Knight et al. (2007) found
similar effects in visual attention. When attention was divided
(viz., participants performed a tone-detection task while view-
ing experimental materials), older adults spent more time than
younger adults viewing negative than positive pictures and faces.
In contrast, when asked to simply to view the images, older adults
attended more to positive versus negative stimuli. Younger adults
showed the opposite pattern. These findings indicate that pos-
itivity effects depend on the availability of cognitive resources.
Positivity is evident when resources are relatively abundant and
undivided, but absent when resources are relatively meager or
divided.
The critical role of cognitive resources in the positivity effect
is further highlighted by research comparing the emotional mem-
ory of healthy younger and older adults with older adults suffering
from Alzheimer’s disease (AD; Fleming et al., 2003). When all three
groups were asked to recall lists of positive, negative, and neutral
words, AD patients remembered a greater proportion of nega-
tive versus positive words compared to both control groups4. In
combination with findings from Mather and Knight (2005) the
observed patterns essentially rule out cognitive decline as a root
cause of positivity. Not only do people who are low in cognitive
reserves show the least positivity, they sometimes favor negative
information.
Explanations for the positivity effect based on motivation ver-
sus degradation are distinguished not only by their emphasis on
cognitive resources, but also by predictions regarding the auto-
maticity and temporal signature of positivity. Cognitive decline
and neural degradation-based accounts are premised on assump-
tions that positivity arises from automatic processes associated
with affect optimizing (Wurm, 2011) or amygdala dysfunction
(Cacioppo et al., 2011), respectively. By contrast a motivational
account attributes positivity to more controlled shifts in atten-
tional resources. Thus, the time course of attentional preferences
is important. Automatic accounts would predict immediate evi-
dence of positivity whereas SST predicts a somewhat delayed
onset. Existing findings support the latter perspective. The time
course of attentional preferences for pairs of faces (in which
one is emotional and the other is neutral) indicates a delayed
onset of positivity consistent with a deliberate re-allocation of
resources (Isaacowitz et al., 2009a). In the latter study, which
used eye-tracking to discern a precise timeline of gaze pat-
terns, older adults’ preferential attention toward positive stim-
uli emerged relatively late after stimulus presentation (500 ms).
Attentional diversion from negative faces was slower still (3 s).
Whereas an automatic account of the positivity effect would be
associated with rapid onset of selective attention, findings sug-
gest that older adults’ early attention – i.e., within 500 ms of
stimulus onset – is actually skewed away from positive faces,
and that their fixation biases toward positive and away from
4Findings in this area are mixed. See Hot et al. (2012), in the current special issue
for a review.
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negative faces increases over time. Complementary evidence for
the delayed onset of positivity was reported by Williams et al.
(2006). They used an event-related potential (ERP) paradigm
to track the temporal pattern of neural responses while peo-
ple viewed emotional faces. As in the study by Isaacowitz et al.
(2009a), Williams et al. did not observe a positivity effect in the
rapid processing of emotionally salient stimuli. On the contrary,
age was associated with reduced activation in the medial pre-
frontal cortex within 150 ms of viewing happy faces. Yet activation
increased later (180–450 ms after onset) in processing of fearful
faces. This pattern suggests that only responses to fearful faces are
down-regulated.
The lack of positivity for relatively automatic processing is
also evident in memory for arousing versus non-arousing words
(Kensinger, 2008). Kensinger presented lists of words varying sys-
tematically in both valence and arousal and subsequently tested
incidental memory. Although a positivity effect was observed in
memory for non-arousing emotionally valenced words, older and
younger adults showed equivalent recall for arousing positive and
negative words, which appear to be processed in a more automatic
manner than non-arousing words (for a discussion, see Kensinger,
2004). Together, findings from these studies suggest that positivity
is absent early in processing and emerges during more controlled
stages of information processing.
Recent evidence based on neuroimaging also supports moti-
vational accounts and speaks against neural degradation. Indeed,
activation patterns in prefrontal regions associated with emotion
regulation parallel the behavioral findings discussed above: Older
versus younger adults recruit medial prefrontal regions (e.g., ante-
rior cingulate) implicated in the regulation of emotion to a greater
extent when processing negative versus positive images (Williams
et al., 2006; Leclerc and Kensinger, 2011), suggesting that they
actively down-regulate affective responses to negative but not pos-
itive stimuli. In a recent study by Ebner et al. (2012), older adults
showed greater activation than younger adults in subregions of the
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (e.g., anterior cingulate and medial
frontal gyrus) while processing angry versus happy faces.
Whereas prefrontal regions are recruited more for negative
versus positive stimuli with age, activation in subcortical neural
regions associated with emotional processing (e.g., amygdala) fol-
lows the opposite age-by-valence interaction (for a review, see
Samanez-Larkin and Carstensen, 2011). In a seminal study by
Mather et al. (2004), older adults showed greater amygdala acti-
vation while attending to and rating positive versus negative
images, whereas amygdala activation in younger adults was equiv-
alent across image valence. Recently Leclerc and Kensinger (2011)
replicated the effect: younger adults showed greater amygdala acti-
vation in response to negative versus positive images. St. Jacques
et al. (2010) posited that the distinct patterns of neural activation
observed in prefrontal and subcortical regions are complementary.
They proposed that increased motivation to regulate emotion leads
older adults to actively engage the mPFC differently than younger
adults, which in turn yields diverging amygdala activation pat-
terns. Consistent with this interpretation, they found evidence of
greater functional connectivity between the anterior cingulate cor-
tex and right amygdala for older versus younger adults during the
viewing and rating of emotionally salient images. In addition to
attention and memory, positivity effects have been observed in
neural regions involved in anticipatory reward. Whereas older and
younger adults show similar levels of activation when anticipating
rewards, only younger adults showed increased activation (cau-
date and insula) when anticipating losses (Samanez-Larkin et al.,
2007).
Age differences in neural recruitment while processing positive
versus negative information have also been observed at the level of
whole-brain activity as indicated by late positive potential (LPP)
brain waves (Kisley et al., 2007). The LPP waveform, which peaks
several hundred milliseconds after stimulus onset (e.g., between
400 and 900 ms in the Kisley et al., 2007 study) tracks the relevance
of stimuli (Schupp et al., 2000) and the allocation of attentional
resources (Hajcak et al., 2006). Kisley et al. (2007) measured LPP
within an adult sample while participants viewed and categorized
a series of emotionally evocative images. Results indicated a sys-
tematic age-by-valence interaction in LPP amplitude consistent
with the positivity effect: Whereas LPP amplitude did not differ
by age in response to viewing positive images, the LPP amplitude
evoked by negative images was inversely associated with age, indi-
cating that older adults devote fewer neurocognitive resources to
processing negative but not positive stimuli.
Reasoning from Cacioppo et al.’s (2011) aging-brain model,
the positivity effect would emerge from dampened emotional
responses to negative (but not positive) stimuli caused by selective
neural degeneration in the amygdala. However, research findings
reviewed above suggest that age differences appear in both nega-
tive and positive reactivity, and across subcortical and prefrontal
regions. Given common brain regions for processing negative and
positive stimuli, one would expect dampened reactivity to negative
and positive stimuli. Moreover, the age-by-valence interactions in
PFC activation suggest selective control of negative and positive.
Specifically, older adults devote more neurocognitive resources
to processing positive stimuli and down-regulating emotional
responses to negative information. Thus, taken together, patterns
of prefrontal and subcortical neural activity provide additional
support for top-down processing.
MALLEABLE OR UNRELIABLE?
Several studies have not observed age differences in positivity, rais-
ing questions about the reliability and robustness of the effect (e.g.,
Kensinger et al., 2002; Grühn et al., 2005; Budson et al., 2006; Gallo
et al., 2009). On close examination, however, the experimental
designs in studies that fail to observe positivity also impose goals
on participants that likely supplant chronically activated goals.
Positivity is reduced when experimental instructions impose goals
that interfere with chronically activated goals. That is, when exper-
iments require participants to process stimuli in a particular way,
e.g. by providing instructions about encoding stimulus valence
(Kensinger et al., 2002) or asking participants to accurately remem-
ber all information (Grühn et al., 2005), positivity is not evident.
In the latter study participants were asked to read lists containing
positive, negative, and neutral words under the explicit instruction
to “recall as many words as possible” for a subsequent memory
test (Grühn et al., 2005, p. 582). Under these circumstances, both
younger and older adults remembered more negative than positive
words. An age-by-valence interaction was not observed.
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On the other hand, positivity appears reliably when exper-
iments do not impose constraints on processing; for example
when participants are asked to simply “view” experimental mate-
rials, rather than explicitly process or commit them to memory.
In such studies, positivity is observed in attention (e.g., Mather
and Carstensen, 2003; Isaacowitz et al., 2006b) and memory (e.g.,
Charles et al., 2003; Kwon et al., 2009). We maintain that such
approaches maximize the likelihood that chronically activated
goals will influence cognitive processing. Our research group con-
ducted two studies to explicitly test these contentions. The first
study, by Löckenhoff and Carstensen (2007), found that when
asked to simply review features of health care plans and physicians
in order to choose among them, older adults disproportionately
reviewed positive features of the alternatives. Positivity in review
was eliminated, however, when experimental instructions explic-
itly primed informational goals (i.e., “please focus on specific facts
and details”). Similar effects of goal manipulations on positivity
were observed in autobiographical memory for emotional, men-
tal, and physical well-being (Kennedy et al., 2004). In the latter
study, the oldest (versus youngest) participants showed positive
memory biases when their recall was prompted by open-ended
instructions. However, when recall was prompted by instructions
to focus on emotion or accuracy both age groups showed positive
and negative memory biases, respectively5.
Although more research is needed, we expect that instructions
that tell participants how to process information are likely to
mask age differences in goals. These varied illustrations of the
context sensitivity or malleability of the positivity effect support
the theoretical contention that top-down processing is involved
in positivity. Such findings also speak strongly against cognitive
decline and neural degradation as the basis for positivity, because
such explanations would not be sensitive to contextual cues.
ADAPTIVE OR MALADAPTIVE?
A key tenet of SST is that observed age differences in motivation
reflect adaptive shifts in goals as people face changing time hori-
zons. Generally speaking, maximizing information seeking and
exploration is adaptive when time horizons are long whereas max-
imizing emotional well-being is adaptive when time horizons are
relatively short. Of course, in the vast majority of studies on the
positivity effect, there is no downside to attending to or remem-
bering positive versus negative information in a biased manner.
Fixating more on a happy versus angry face or remembering a
photo of a smiling baby while forgetting one of a corpse has
no detrimental consequences in the laboratory. But everyday life
does present situations in which selective attention and memory
are likely maladaptive. The question that arises is whether pri-
oritization of positive information is set aside when stakes are
high. Do older adults also show positive default processing ten-
dencies when making high-stakes medical or financial decisions?
5Prior to providing retrospective reports, participants assigned to the accuracy-
focused condition were told to “answer the questions as accurately as you can,”
whereas participants in the emotion-focused condition were instructed to “focus on
how you are feeling while answering the questions.” Participants in the control (i.e.,
open-ended) condition were simply asked to “answer the questions as you think you
answered them back then.”
That is, will positivity be observed when reviewing information
about critical health care decisions (e.g., whether to treat cancer
via surgery versus radiation therapy) and whether to invest retire-
ment savings in a new company? Preliminary evidence suggests
that the answer may be no. In a recent study by our research group
(English, 2012), healthy and unhealthy older adults made a series
of health-related (e.g., among physicians) and non-health-related
decisions (e.g., among cars). Findings revealed significantly less
positivity in health-related information review among participants
in poor health relative to healthy participants. When making non-
health-related decisions health status was unrelated to information
review patterns. These findings indicate that older adults do indeed
engage with negative material in contexts where avoiding it may
have detrimental effects on well-being.
Older adults’ adaptive engagement with negative material also
extends to situations involving threat. Prior research has found
that younger people identify threatening (i.e., angry) faces faster
than other emotions (for a review, see Vuilleumier, 2002), a pattern
that has been interpreted as an adaptive and automatic response
to threat (Öhman et al., 2001). Mather and Knight (2006) asked
whether positivity in cognitive processing would preclude older
people from displaying a similarly adaptive pattern. They admin-
istered a visual search task in which younger and older individuals
were presented with an array of schematic faces containing eight
neutral distractor faces and one target face depicting a happy, sad,
or angry expression. Though theoretical accounts of positivity
based on decline or degradation would predict age-related impair-
ments in the speed of detecting angry versus happy faces, results
indicated that older participants were faster to identify angry faces
than happy or sad faces (younger adults showed a similar pattern).
Thus, older adults prioritized the processing of negative over pos-
itive information when it held survival value (i.e., for angry but
not sad faces).
Although evidence suggests that positivity is suppressed in sit-
uations where attending to negative information is adaptive, is
positivity amplified when prioritizing emotional well-being is
especially beneficial? There is some evidence that a positivity effect
in gaze preferences is exacerbated in contexts that demand the
regulation of emotion. Isaacowitz et al. (2008) observed minimal
age differences in attentional preferences when individuals were
induced into feeling neutral or positive moods6. However, when
induced into negative moods, a robust positivity effect emerged.
Younger adults oriented strongly toward negative faces whereas
older adults oriented strongly toward positive faces. Thus, there
is some intriguing evidence that older adults may actively deploy
positivity to improve mood.
DOES THE POSITIVITY EFFECT ENHANCE OR IMPAIR
COGNITIVE PROCESSING?
One reasonable hypothesis, based on the literature reviewed above,
is that older peoples’ preferential attention to and memory for
positive versus negative information gives rise to suboptimal out-
comes for decision making and deliberative problem solving.
6In the neutral and positive affect conditions the only significant age difference was
that younger adults attended more to positive faces compared to older adults.
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In this section we discuss empirical evidence that supports or
contradicts such predictions.
As noted above, older adults disproportionately seek, attend
to, and remember positive more than negative information when
making decisions (Mather et al., 2005; Löckenhoff and Carstensen,
2007, 2008; Kim et al., 2008). But does this cause them to make
poor choices? Extant research on risky and riskless decision mak-
ing suggests that the answer, to date, is no. Mikels and Reed (2009)
found that older adults were no more likely than younger adults to
make suboptimal decisions (i.e., selecting an option with a lower
expected value) when considering risky choices framed in terms of
losses as opposed to gains. Another study using a sample of adults
spanning the adult age range failed to observe age-by-valence
interactions in risky choices; all age groups made objectively bet-
ter decisions on gain versus loss trials (Weller et al., 2011). The
positivity effect also does not appear to impair riskless decisions.
Using multi-choice, multi-attribute decision tasks involving both
positive and negative cues (i.e., choices among grocery stores and
apartments), Hess et al. (2012) observed equivalent decision qual-
ity among younger and older adults. Evidence also suggests that
the positivity effect does not impair – and may even benefit – sub-
jective choice quality. For example, when older adults were asked
to make lists of pros and cons to guide decisions among actual con-
sumer products (i.e., a pen, mug, flashlight, and whiteboard) they
reported more satisfaction than younger adults with their choices
(e.g., Kim et al., 2008). By contrast, satisfaction did not differ across
age groups when participants did not make pro-con lists prior to
choosing. Taken together, the evidence thus far suggests that older
adults’ preferential processing of positive versus negative informa-
tion does not impair their decision making ability, and in some
cases may lead to improved decision outcomes.
Given that effective interpersonal problem solving necessitates
processing and acting upon negative and positive information,
one might expect that older adults’ avoidance of negative infor-
mation would be detrimental. Moreover, prior research points to
an association between advanced age and the disproportionate
use of avoidant versus instrumental strategies (e.g., Blanchard-
Fields et al., 2007). Here too, however, evidence suggests that
problem solving abilities improve with age. Despite older adults’
general preference for avoidant strategies, it appears that they
apply a greater range of problem solving strategies more flexi-
bly across situations compared to younger adults (for a review, see
Blanchard-Fields, 2007).
By no means is the evidence on this point conclusive. Indeed,
preferential processing of any category of stimuli is likely to involve
some downside. However, in the domains of decision making and
problem solving, findings to date fail to raise red flags.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Although researchers have made a great deal of progress under-
standing the positivity effect, many questions remain. Evidence
that positivity in cognitive processing is causally related to emo-
tional well-being in older adults is scant, for example (for a
discussion, see Isaacowitz and Blanchard-Fields, 2012). SST main-
tains that behavioral and cognitive selection operate in the service
of emotion-related goals. Selective exposure is arguably the most
effective way to regulate emotional states and there is considerable
evidence that older people are more selective than younger peo-
ple in their choice of social partners and environments (for a
review, see Charles and Carstensen, 2010). Despite abundant evi-
dence that older people are both relatively more selective (Charles
and Carstensen, 2010) and experience a relatively positive bal-
ance of emotions in daily life (Carstensen et al., 2011), a causal
link between selective exposure and emotional well-being has not
been established.
Isaacowitz and Blanchard-Fields (2012) proposed the intrigu-
ing idea that positivity may also operate in the active regulation
of negative mood states. To our knowledge, the mood-benefiting
effects of positivity in online regulation have been demonstrated
in only one study. Interestingly, findings suggested that executive
control was a key moderator. Only older adults who had high levels
of executive control and showed positive gaze preferences avoided
negative mood changes (Isaacowitz et al., 2009b). This finding
fits well with research conducted by Mather and others linking
stronger evidence of positivity to greater cognitive control (e.g.,
Mather and Knight, 2005), and contributes to arguments that that
top-down processing is required for deployment of goal-directed
efforts.
Because laboratory experiments generally rely on weak emo-
tional elicitors, such as synthetic face stimuli and word lists, which
are unlikely to alter emotion states regardless of processing ten-
dencies, strong tests of hypotheses about online regulation have
yet to appear in the literature. Future research should examine
the link between positivity in emotional processing and outcomes
using stimuli that elicit stronger and more long-lasting effects on
emotional experience.
Our research group has begun to test hypotheses about ways
in which positivity may heighten older peoples’ susceptibility to
problems encountered in everyday life, such as financial fraud. It
is well-established that older people are the most frequent targets
of financial scams and, for a variety of reasons, may be particularly
susceptible, although great susceptibility has not been established
(Shadel, 2012). Preferences that favor positive and ignore neg-
ative information could contribute to such susceptibility, either
because potential warning signs are ignored or because messages
about too-good-to-be-true prospects are especially salient. On the
other hand, research reviewed above suggests that older people
may discard positivity in high-stakes situations. Because of its dire
consequences for older people, examining the role of positivity in
fraud victimization is a worthwhile aim for future research.
Decision quality remains an important and understudied issue,
and there are many reasons to expect that decision quality may
suffer with age (see Peters et al., 2011, for an excellent review).
Although, as noted above, recent findings offer no support for
claims that positivity per se impairs older adults’ decision out-
comes, the downstream effects of positivity in attention and
memory on choice quality remain largely unexplored. To our
knowledge no study has examined objective choice quality for
actual (as opposed to hypothetical) decisions across age groups
and as a function of information valence7. Given that millions
7Although participants in the Kim et al. (2008) study made decisions about actual as
opposed to hypothetical options, objective decision quality could not be examined
because the options were roughly equivalent in value and utility.
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of older adults are tasked with making important health-related
decisions each year (e.g., Medicare Part D), it is imperative to
understand whether motivations to seek positive and avoid neg-
ative information undermine the quality of these decisions. A
related question for future research to consider is whether pos-
itive features of options drive choices more than negative features
among older adults.
Both fraud victimization and decision making represent
domains in which future research is needed to elucidate the pre-
cise conditions under which older adults’ relative bias toward the
positive may be adaptive versus maladaptive. Such insights will
have valuable applications to public policy: If, for example, older
adults’ increased attention and memory for positive information
improves their decision making for positively framed attributes,
then physicians, hospitals, and policy makers might consider
reframing decisions accordingly, so as to optimize choice quality.
The contributions of meaningfulness and time perspective to
positivity have yet to be explored. SST maintains that age differ-
ences in the salience of emotionally meaningful goals are driven
by constraints on future time. A considerable number of empir-
ical studies in the realm of social choice support this contention
(for a review, see Charles and Carstensen, 2010). To date, however,
no studies have linked time horizons and meaningfulness to posi-
tivity in cognitive processing. SST predicts that relative to younger
adults, older adults will devote more resources to processing highly
meaningful information even if it engenders negative emotions.
Although strong tests of this prediction have not been carried out,
there is some suggestion that this may be the case. Fung et al.
(2008) examined attentional preferences among Chinese residents
of Hong Kong, a culture in which positive information is con-
sidered to be less meaningful than in Western cultures. Using the
same eye-tracking paradigm as Isaacowitz et al. (2006b), Fung et
al. found no evidence of positivity in the East Asian sample. In
fact, older adults in their study demonstrated a greater preference
for negative faces than did younger adults. Aside from illustrating
that positivity may be culturally specific, these findings suggest
the possibility that the positivity effect as it is typically observed
does not depend on the valence of positive information per se, but
rather the meaning attached to positive information. Because the
study did not explicitly manipulate the meaningfulness of posi-
tive or negative stimuli, the lack of an observed positivity effect
could reflect any number of cultural differences between Eastern
and Western samples, of course, such as dialectical thinking or the
degree to which mixed emotions are experienced. On the other
hand, the positivity effect has been observed and replicated in pic-
ture memory among Korean samples (Kwon et al., 2009; Ko et al.,
2011), adding further nuance to conclusions about cross-cultural
relevance. To bring needed clarity to this area, future research
would benefit from testing the positivity effect in contexts where
emotional valence and meaningfulness can be better separated. In
addition, because time horizons are the presumed theoretical dri-
vers of age differences in goals that underlie the positivity effect,
research on the role of perceived time in positivity is needed.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
As we have reviewed above, the motivational explanation for the
positivity effect finds considerable support in the empirical lit-
erature. Research findings from dozens of studies are consistent
with theoretically derived postulates that positivity reflects con-
trolled cognition and chronically activated goals, is influenced
by situational or contextual factors, and is largely adaptive for
everyday functioning and well-being. Recent research has helped
to illuminate conditions where the positivity effect is most and
least likely to appear: Positivity appears when cognitive resources
are available, when experimental tasks or stimuli do not activate
automatic processing, and when information processing is uncon-
strained by external factors such as task instructions. In contrast,
positivity is not observed when cognitive resources are significantly
reduced (due to cognitive decline or experimental manipulations),
when experimental tasks or stimuli elicit automatic processing or
when situational demands supplant chronically activated goals.
It appears increasingly that positivity may be reduced when the
stakes are high. Taken together, the phenomenon appears to reflect
a default cognitive processing approach in later life that favors
information relevant to emotion-regulatory goals. Older people
place high value on goals related to well-being and, all things
being equal, cognitive processing operates under the influence of
such goals.
In less than a decade, the positivity effect has become a well-
replicated empirical observation. As more evidence accumulates
and the guiding theory becomes more nuanced and detailed, it
will be possible to test its various aspects with greater precision.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work was supported by National Institute on Aging MERIT
Award AG08816 to Laura L. Carstensen. We thank Tammy English
and Nanna Notthoff for their helpful comments on earlier drafts
of this manuscript.
REFERENCES
Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Finke-
nauer, C., and Vohs, K. D. (2001).
Bad is stronger than good. Rev. Gen.
Psychol. 5, 323–370.
Blanchard-Fields, F. (2007). Every-
day problem solving and emotion:
an adult developmental perspective.
Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci. 16, 26–31.
Blanchard-Fields, F., Mienaltowski, A.,
and Seay, R. B. (2007). Age differ-
ences in everyday problem-solving
effectiveness: older adults select
more effective strategies for inter-
personal problems. J. Gerontol. B
Psychol. Sci. Soc. Sci. 62B, P61–P64.
Budson, A. E., Todman, R. W., Chong,
H., Adams, E. H., Kensinger, E.
A., Krangel, T. S., and Wright,
C. I. (2006). False recognition of
emotional word lists in aging and
Alzheimer disease. Cogn. Behav.
Neurol. 19, 71–78.
Cacioppo, J. T., Berntson, G. G.,
Bechara, A., Tranel, D., and Hawk-
ley, L. C. (2011). “Could an aging
brain contribute to subjective well-
being? The value added by a
social neuroscience perspective,” in
Social Neuroscience: Toward Under-
standing the Underpinnings of the
Social Mind, eds A. Todorov, S.
T. Fiske, and D. A. Prentice (New
York: Oxford University Press),
249–262.
Carstensen, L. L. (1993). “Motiva-
tion for social contact across the
life span: a theory of socioe-
motional selectivity,” in Nebraska
Symposium on Motivation: 1992,
Developmental Perspectives on Moti-
vation, Vol. 40, ed. J. E. Jacobs (Lin-
coln: University of Nebraska Press),
209–254.
Carstensen, L. L. (2006). The influence
of a sense of time on human devel-
opment. Science 312, 1913–1915.
Carstensen, L. L., Isaacowitz, D. M.,
and Charles, S. T. (1999). Taking
time seriously: a theory of socioe-
motional selectivity.Am. Psychol. 54,
165–181.
www.frontiersin.org September 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 339 | 7
Reed and Carstensen Age-related positivity effect
Carstensen, L. L., and Löckenhoff, C. E.
(2003). “Aging, emotion, and evolu-
tion: the bigger picture,” in Emotions
Inside Out: 130 Years After Darwin’s
the Expression of the Emotions inMan
andAnimals, eds P. Ekman, J. J. Cam-
pos, R. J. Davidson, and F. B. M.
D. Waal (New York, NY: Annals of
the New York Academy of Sciences),
152–179.
Carstensen, L. L., Turan, B., Scheibe,
S., Ram, N., Ersner-Hershfield, H.,
Samanez-Larkin, G. R., Brooks, K. P.,
and Nesselroade, J. R. (2011). Emo-
tional experience improves with age:
evidence based on over 10 years of
experience sampling. Psychol. Aging
26, 21–33.
Charles, S. T., and Carstensen, L. L.
(2010). Social and emotional aging.
Annu. Rev. Psychol. 61, 383–409.
Charles, S. T., Mather, M., and
Carstensen, L. L. (2003). Aging and
emotional memory: the forgettable
nature of negative images for older
adults. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 132,
310–324.
Chartrand, T. L., and Bargh, J. A. (1996).
Automatic activation of impres-
sion formation and memorization
goals: nonconscious goal priming
reproduces effects of explicit task
instructions. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 71,
464–478.
Comblain, C., D’Argembeau, A., Van
der Linden, M., and Aldenhoff, L.
(2004). The effect of ageing on the
recollection of emotional and neu-
tral pictures. Memory 12, 673–684.
Ebner, N. C., Johnson, M. K., and
Fischer, H. (2012). Neural
mechanisms of reading facial
emotions in young and older
adults. Front. Psychol. 3:223.
doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00223
English, T. (2012). Aging, Emotion, and
Health-Related Decisions: the Role
of Health Status. Berkeley: Depart-
ment of Psychology, University of
California.
Fernandes, M., Ross, M., Wiegand, M.,
and Schryer, E. (2008). Are the
memories of older adults positively
biased? Psychol. Aging 23, 297–306.
Fleming, K., Kim, S. H., Doo, M.,
Maguire, G., and Potkin, S. G.
(2003). Memory for emotional stim-
uli in patients with Alzheimer’s dis-
ease. Am. J. Alzheimers Dis. Other
Demen. 18, 340–342.
Fredrickson, B. L., and Carstensen, L.
L. (1990). Choosing social partners:
how old age and anticipated endings
make people more selective. Psychol.
Aging 5, 335–347.
Fung, H. H., and Carstensen, L. L.
(2004). Motivational changes in
response to blocked goals and
foreshortened time: testing alterna-
tives for socioemotional selectivity
theory. Psychol. Aging 19, 68–78.
Fung, H. H., and Carstensen, L. L.
(2006). Goals change when life’s
fragility is primed: lessons learned
from older adults, the September
11th attacks and SARS. Soc. Cogn. 24,
248–278.
Fung, H. H., Carstensen, L. L., and
Lutz, A. M. (1999). Influence of time
on social preferences: implications
for life-span development. Psychol.
Aging 14, 595–604.
Fung, H. H., Lu, A. Y., Goren, D., Isaa-
cowitz, D. M., Wadlinger, H. A., and
Wilson, H. R. (2008). Age-related
positivity enhancement is not uni-
versal: older Chinese look away from
positive stimuli. Psychol. Aging 23,
440–446.
Gallo, D. A., Foster, K. T., and Johnson,
E. L. (2009). Elevated false recollec-
tion of emotional pictures in young
and older adults. Psychol. Aging 24,
981–988.
Grühn, D., Smith, J., and Baltes, P.
B. (2005). No aging bias favor-
ing memory for positive mater-
ial: evidence from a heterogeneity-
homogeneity list paradigm using
emotionally toned words. Psychol.
Aging 20, 579–588.
Hajcak, G., Moser, J. S., and Simons, R. F.
(2006). Attending to affect: appraisal
strategies modulate the electrocor-
tical response to arousing pictures.
Emotion 6, 517–522.
Hawkes, K. (2003). Grandmothers and
the evolution of human longevity.
Am. J. Hum. Biol. 15, 380–400.
Hess, T. M., Queen, T. L., and Pat-
terson, T. R. (2012). To deliberate
or not to deliberate: interactions
between age, task characteristics,
and cognitive activity on decision
making. J. Behav. Decis. Mak. 25,
29–40.
Hot, P., Klein-Koerkamp, Y., and Baciu,
M. (2012). Preserved and impaired
emotional memory in Alzheimer’s
disease. Front. Psychol. 3:331.
doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00331
Isaacowitz, D. M., Allard, E. S., Murphy,
N. A., and Schlangel, M. (2009a).
The time course of age-related pref-
erences toward positive and negative
stimuli. J. Gerontol. B Psychol. Sci.
Soc. Sci. 64B, 188–192.
Isaacowitz, D. M., Toner, K., and Neu-
pert, S. D. (2009b). Use of gaze for
real-time mood regulation: effects
of age and attentional functioning.
Psychol. Aging 24, 989–994.
Isaacowitz, D. M., and Blanchard-Fields,
F. (2012). Linking process and out-
come in the study of emotion and
aging. Perspect. Psychol. Sci. 7, 3–17.
Isaacowitz, D. M., Toner, K., Goren, D.,
and Wilson, H. R. (2008). Look-
ing while unhappy mood-congruent
gaze in young adults, positive gaze
in older adults. Psychol. Sci. 19,
848–853.
Isaacowitz, D. M., Wadlinger, H. A.,
Goren, D., and Wilson, H. R.
(2006a). Is there an age-related pos-
itivity effect in visual attention? A
comparison of two methodologies.
Emotion 6, 511–516.
Isaacowitz, D. M., Wadlinger, H. A.,
Goren, D., and Wilson, H. R.
(2006b). Selective preference in
visual fixation away from negative
images in old age? An eye-tracking
study. Psychol. Aging 21, 40–48.
Kennedy, Q., Mather, M., and
Carstensen, L. L. (2004). The
role of motivation in the age-related
positivity effect in autobiographical
memory. Psychol. Sci. 15, 208–214.
Kensinger, E. A. (2004). Remembering
emotional experiences: the contri-
bution of valence and arousal. Rev.
Neurosci. 15, 231–307.
Kensinger, E. A. (2008). Age differ-
ences in memory for arousing and
nonarousing emotional words. J.
Gerontol. B Psychol. Sci. Soc. Sci. 63B,
P13–P18.
Kensinger, E. A., Brierley, B., Med-
ford, N., Growdon, J. H., and
Corkin, S. (2002). Effects of nor-
mal aging and Alzheimer’s disease
on emotional memory. Emotion 2,
118–134.
Kensinger, E. A., O’Brien, J. L., Swan-
berg, K., Garoff-Eaton, R. J., and
Schacter, D. L. (2007). The effects
of emotional content on reality-
monitoring performance in young
and older adults. Psychol. Aging 22,
752–764.
Kim, S., Healey, M. K., Goldstein, D.,
Hasher, L., and Wiprzycka, U. J.
(2008). Age differences in choice
satisfaction: a positivity effect in
decision making. Psychol. Aging 23,
33–38.
Kisley, M. A., Wood, S., and Burrows,
C. L. (2007). Looking at the sunny
side of life: age-related change in an
event-related potential measure of
the negativity bias. Psychol. Sci. 18,
838–843.
Knight, M., Seymour, T. L., Gaunt,
J. T., Baker, C., Nesmith, K., and
Mather, M. (2007). Aging and goal-
directed emotional attention: dis-
traction reverses emotional biases.
Emotion 7, 705–714.
Ko, S. G., Lee, T. H., Yoon, H. Y., Kwon,
J. H., and Mather, M. (2011). How
does context affect assessments of
facial emotion? The role of culture
and age. Psychol. Aging 26, 48–59.
Kwon, Y., Scheibe, S., Samanez-Larkin,
G. R., Tsai, J. L., and Carstensen,
L. L. (2009). Replicating the posi-
tivity effect in picture memory in
Koreans: evidence for cross-cultural
generalizability. Psychol. Aging 24,
748–754.
Labouvie-Vief, G., Grühn, D., and
Studer, J. (2010). “Dynamic integra-
tion of emotion and cognition: equi-
librium regulation in development
and aging,” in The Handbook of Life-
Span Development, Vol. 2, eds R. M.
Lerner, M. E. Lamb, and A. M. Fre-
und (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons,
Inc.), 79–115.
Leclerc, C. M., and Kensinger, E. A.
(2011). Neural processing of emo-
tional pictures and words: a compar-
ison of young and older adults. Dev.
Neuropsychol. 36, 519–538.
Leigland, L. A., Schulz, L. E., and
Janowsky, J. S. (2004). Age related
changes in emotional memory. Neu-
robiol. Aging 25, 1117–1124.
Löckenhoff, C. E., and Carstensen, L. L.
(2007). Aging, emotion, and health-
related decision strategies: moti-
vational manipulations can reduce
age differences. Psychol. Aging 22,
134–146.
Löckenhoff, C. E., and Carstensen, L. L.
(2008). Decision strategies in health
care choices for self and others: older
but not younger adults make adjust-
ments for the age of the decision
target. J. Gerontol. B Psychol. Sci. Soc.
Sci. 63, P106–P109.
Mather, M. (2006). “Why memories
may become more positive as peo-
ple age,” in Memory and Emotion:
Interdisciplinary Perspectives, eds B.
Uttl, N. Ohta, and A. L. Siegen-
thaler (Malden: Blackwell Publish-
ing), 135–158.
Mather, M., Canli, T., English, T., Whit-
field, S., Wais, P., Ochsner, K., and
Carstensen, L. L. (2004). Amygdala
responses to emotionally valenced
stimuli in older and younger adults.
Psychol. Sci. 15, 259–263.
Mather, M., and Carstensen, L. L.
(2003). Aging and attentional biases
for emotional faces. Psychol. Sci. 14,
409–415.
Mather, M., and Carstensen, L. L.
(2005). Aging and motivated cogni-
tion: the positivity effect in attention
and memory. Trends Cogn. Sci. 9,
496–502.
Mather, M., and Johnson, M. K. (2000).
Choice-supportive source monitor-
ing: do our decisions seem better
to us as we age? Psychol. Aging 15,
596–606.
Mather, M., and Knight, M. (2005).
Goal-directed memory: the role of
cognitive control in older adults’
Frontiers in Psychology | Emotion Science September 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 339 | 8
Reed and Carstensen Age-related positivity effect
emotional memory. Psychol. Aging
20, 554–570.
Mather, M., Knight, M., and McCaf-
frey, M. (2005). The allure of
the alignable: younger and older
adults’ false memories of choice
features. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 134,
38–51.
Mather, M., and Knight, M. R. (2006).
Angry faces get noticed quickly:
threat detection is not impaired
among older adults. J. Geron-
tol. B Psychol. Sci. Soc. Sci. 61B,
P54–P57.
Mikels, J. A., Larkin, G. R., Reuter-
Lorenz, P. A., and Carstensen, L.
L. (2005). Divergent trajectories in
the aging mind: changes in working
memory for affective versus visual
information with age. Psychol. Aging
20, 542–553.
Mikels, J. A., and Reed, A. E. (2009).
Monetary losses do not loom large
in later life: age differences in the
framing effect. J. Gerontol. B Psychol.
Sci. Soc. Sci. 64B, 457–460.
Moskowitz, G. B. (2002). Preconscious
effects of temporary goals on atten-
tion. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol.38,397–404.
Murphy, N. A., and Isaacowitz, D. M.
(2008). Preferences for emotional
information in older and younger
adults: a meta-analysis of memory
and attention tasks. Psychol. Aging
23, 263–286.
Neisser, U. (1979). “The control
of information pickup in selec-
tive looking,” in Perception and
its Development: A Tribute to
Eleanor J. Gibson, ed. A. D. Pick
(Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum),
201–219.
Öhman, A., Lundqvist, D., and Esteves,
F. (2001). The face in the crowd
revisited: a threat advantage with
schematic stimuli. J. Pers. Soc. Psy-
chol. 80, 381–396.
Peters, E., Dieckmann, N. F., and Weller,
J. (2011). “Age differences in com-
plex decision making,” in Hand-
book of the Psychology of Aging, 7th
Edn, eds K. W. Schaie and S. L.
Willis (San Diego: Academic Press),
133–151.
Piguet, O., Connally, E., Krendl, A. C.,
Huot, J. R., and Corkin, S. (2008).
False memory in aging: effects of
emotional valence on word recog-
nition accuracy. Psychol. Aging 23,
307–314.
Ready, R. E., Weinberger, M. I., and
Jones, K. M. (2007). How happy
have you felt lately? Two diary
studies of emotion recall in older
and younger adults. Cogn. Emot. 21,
728–757.
Rozin, P., and Royzman, E. B. (2001).
Negativity bias, negativity domi-
nance, and contagion. Person. Soc.
Psychol. Rev. 5, 296–320.
Samanez-Larkin, G. R., and Carstensen,
L. L. (2011). “Socioemotional func-
tioning and the aging brain,” in
The Oxford Handbook of Social Neu-
roscience, eds J. Decety and J. T.
Cacioppo (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press), 507–521.
Samanez-Larkin, G. R., Gibbs, S.
E. B., Khanna, K., Nielsen, L.,
Carstensen, L. L., and Knutson,
B. (2007). Anticipation of mone-
tary gain but not loss in healthy
older adults. Nat. Neurosci. 10,
787–791.
Schlagman, S., Schulz, J., and Kvavi-
lashvili, L. (2006). A content analy-
sis of involuntary autobiographical
memories: examining the positiv-
ity effect in old age. Memory 14,
161–175.
Schupp, H. T., Cuthbert, B. N., Bradley,
M. M., Cacioppo, J. T., Ito, T., and
Lang, P. J. (2000). Affective pic-
ture processing: the late positive
potential is modulated by moti-
vational relevance. Psychophysiology
37, 257–261.
Shadel, D. (2012).Outsmarting the Scam
Artists.Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons,
Inc.
Shamaskin, A. M., Mikels, J. A., and
Reed, A. E. (2010). Getting the
message across: age differences in
the positive and negative framing of
health care messages. Psychol. Aging
25, 746–751.
Spaniol, J., Voss, A., and Grady,
C. L. (2008). Aging and emo-
tional memory: cognitive
mechanisms underlying the
positivity effect. Psychol. Aging 23,
859–872.
St. Jacques, P., Dolcos, F., and Cabeza,
R. (2010). Effects of aging on
functional connectivity of the
amygdala during negative eval-
uation: a network analysis of
fMRI data. Neurobiol. Aging 31,
315–327.
Vuilleumier, P. (2002). Facial expression
and selective attention. Curr. Opin.
Psychiatry 15, 291–300.
Weller, J. A., Levin, I. P., and Den-
burg, N. L. (2011). Trajectory of
risky decision making for poten-
tial gains and losses from ages 5
to 85. J. Behav. Decis. Mak. 24,
331–344.
Williams, L. M., Brown, K. J., Palmer,
D., Liddell, B. J., Kemp, A. H.,
Olivieri, G., and Gordon, E. (2006).
The mellow years? Neural basis
of improving emotional stabil-
ity over age. J. Neurosci. 26,
6422–6430.
Wurm, L. H. (2011). Decreasing com-
plexity of affective space in older
adults lower on cognitive control:
affective effects in a nonaffective
task and with nonaffective stimuli.
Psychol. Aging 26, 716–730.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The
authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any com-
mercial or financial relationships that
could be construed as a potential con-
flict of interest.
Received: 18 May 2012; accepted: 23
August 2012; published online: 27 Sep-
tember 2012.
Citation: Reed AE and Carstensen LL
(2012) The theory behind the age-related
positivity effect. Front. Psychology 3:339.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00339
This article was submitted to Frontiers in
Emotion Science, a specialty of Frontiers
in Psychology.
Copyright © 2012 Reed and Carstensen.
This is an open-access article distributed
under the terms of the Creative Com-
mons Attribution License, which per-
mits use, distribution and reproduction
in other forums, provided the original
authors and source are credited and sub-
ject to any copyright notices concerning
any third-party graphics etc.
www.frontiersin.org September 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 339 | 9
